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Introduction
Educational wage differentials have risen significantly in the past 30 years. Heckman et al. (2010) estimate that the return to graduating from high school in the U.S. has risen by 50 percent in recent decades. Acemoglu and Autor (2011) estimate that between 1980 and 2008, the college wage premium has roughly doubled. These large returns are not only present for average students, but also for those who are academically marginal (Zimmerman 2014; Goodman et al.
Forthcoming; Canaan and Mouganie 2016).
A series of influential papers attribute these wage differentials, in part, to an insufficient investment in human capital, particularly by American youth (Katz and Murphy 1992; Goldin and Katz 2008; Acemoglu and Autor 2011) . Previous studies have argued that constraints in accessing post-secondary education could explain why the supply of skilled labor continues to lag behind the demand (Zimmerman 2014). For example, lack of access to short-term credit may prevent some individuals from attending college (Avery and Kane 2004; Dynarski and ScottClayton 2008) . Decreasing the accessibility or increasing the cost of post-secondary education and training may deter marginal students from making such investments (Bound and Turner 2007; Zimmerman 2014) . Consequently, some students may perceive a reduced benefit from a high school degree if they are unable to access post-secondary education or other skill training that requires a high school degree. 1 1 Many studies have used demand-driven shocks to estimate the impact of local economic conditions on human capital accumulation. For some examples see Topel (1986) , Batrik (1991) , Blanchard and Katz (1992) , Black et al. (2005a) , Black et al. (2005b) , Atkin (Forthcoming) , and Jacobsen and Parker (Forthcoming) . See also Kane (1994) and Berger and Kostal (2002) . The relationship between economic conditions and educational choices can also vary by gender, race, family background, degree level, and ability (Bedard and Herman 2006; Black and Sufi 2002). 2 Serving in the U.S. military is an important pathway through which young Americans can invest in their human capital. The military trains youth with no previous labor market experience in a variety of valuable skills, and offers subsidized college education for those who qualify (Lutz 2008; Patten and Parker 2011) . 2 The military option is particularly important for individuals from low socioeconomic backgrounds who otherwise might not be able to enroll in college or obtain similar skills.
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The cost of military service, and thus the cost of obtaining these educational and training benefits, increases during wartime. In this paper we study the impact of a change in the (perceived) desirability of military service on the decision to enlist in the military and subsequent schooling outcomes. A change in the desirability of enlisting in the military can affect the educational outcomes and human capital investments for marginal candidates through two main channels. First, because high school graduation is one of the military's main enlistment criteria, increasing the cost of military service decreases the benefits to potential military recruits from graduating high school and could result in an increase in the probability of marginal students dropping out. Second, conditional on high school graduation, forgoing the military option can limit access to college education for individuals at the margin of college attendance by increasing its cost. Both of these channels can subsequently impact the long-run labor market outcomes of potential recruits.
2 Historically, a large proportion of federal college aid grants were provided to veterans, increasing the lifetime benefits from military service (Deming and Dynarski 2010).
We measure changes in the desirability of military service using monthly (and yearly) variation in U.S. combat casualties across counties (and states) during 1997-2013 . During this time period there were 6,823 combat casualties that occurred during the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars. Our identifying assumption is that the assignment of casualties from local areas in the U.S.
is as-good-as random and that it does not impact the military's local demand for soldiers, which is instead set at the national level. Although the risk of military service at any point in time is set at the national level, local-level casualties may have a particularly salient effect on marginal recruits.
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Using internal military data, we first verify the relationship between local casualties and enlistment decisions. The results suggest that an increase in the monthly number of casualties in a county decreases the overall number of enlistments, consistent with the findings of Christensen (2015) . More importantly, we find that the decrease in the number of enlistments is larger among young, white individuals, and those in the middle of the ability distribution, suggesting that wartime conditions impact the composition of new recruits, at least in the short run. We also find that an increase in the number of county-level casualties increases the likelihood that a newly signed recruit from that county will choose to discharge from service prior to shipping off to basic training. 5 This relationship is also stronger for young recruits with medium to high Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores.
Next, we study whether increasing the cost of military service changed the educational investments of marginal recruits in the long run. We use data drawn from the [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] 4 American Community Survey (ACS) and combine it with the annual number of state-level casualties individuals were exposed to at a young age, when educational investments are being made. Confirming our results on enlistments, we find that exposure to casualties decreases the likelihood of ever serving in the military. Our main results indicate that an increase of 100 casualties at ages 17-18 increases the probability of dropping out from high school by about 3
percent. This is a novel finding, suggesting that increasing access to post-secondary education and training options positively impacts the high school graduation outcomes of marginal recruits.
Interestingly, this effect is primarily driven by Hispanic men. As expected, exposure to casualties at ages 15-16 or 19-20 has no effect on high school graduation. The results also suggest that an increase of 100 casualties at ages 17-18 decreases the probability of obtaining any college education, graduating with an associate degree, or graduating with a bachelor's degree (BA)
degree by about 1-3 percent. Exposure to casualties at ages 15-16 has no impact on college outcomes. In contrast to the high school results, the results on college outcomes are driven primarily by white men, suggesting that the marginal person for each of these choices is different. These effects are economically important especially considering that the overall (national) impact of wartime conditions on military service are likely to be significantly higher.
Our natural experiment offers an answer to an important policy question: How does improving access to obtaining human capital impact schooling choices for marginal students? 6 The results suggest that increasing the cost of access to post-secondary education or training has detrimental effects on human capital investments for both individuals at the high school graduation margin and for those who are at the margin of attending college. Moreover, although 5 the military is one of the largest employers of young men in the U.S., this is the first study to examine the relationship between a change in the cost of military service and schooling outcomes both prior to and subsequent to any potential military service. In contrast, previous studies have primarily focused on the educational and labor market effects of military service (Angrist 1990; Angrist 1993; Angrist and Krueger 1994; Card and Lemieux 2001; Angrist and Chen 2011) , but it remains unclear how the availability of voluntary military service is related to the educational outcomes of potential recruits. 7 More broadly, the study also contributes to the literature on the effects of college aid. Previous studies have shown that increasing college aid leads to an increase in the probability of college attendance (Dynarski 2003; Dynarski 2005) .
Consistent with these results, we find that limiting access to subsidized higher education (by increasing the cost of joining the military) decreases the probability of obtaining college education.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a background about the Military's recruitment process and national enlistments trends. Section 3 verifies the relationship between local U.S. combat causalities and the number and characteristics of new enlistees using internal military data. Our main analysis is in Section 4, where we estimate the effect of local casualties on educational outcomes, and perform robustness checks. We conclude in section 5.
7 Bound and Turner (2002) and Stanley (2003) estimate the effects of the GI Bill for World War II and the Korean veterans and find that it increased the schooling of veterans. Lemieux and Card (2001) 14 These include arithmetic reasoning, mathematics knowledge, paragraph comprehension, and word knowledge. 15 The reference group is a sample of 18 to 23-year-old youth who took the ASVAB as part of a national norming study conducted in both 1980 and again in 1997. An AFQT score of 50 indicates that the examinee scored as well as or better than 50 percent of the nationally-representative sample.
8 with a service counselor to determine a best fit military job. 16 Finally, applicants sign a contract and swear or affirm an oath of military service. It is only after these steps have been completed that an applicant is recorded as a contract.
Stage three occurs when a contract recruit is shipped to basic training and is recorded as an accession. However, there are normally two paths to accession. The first are "Direct Ship"
recruits who report to basic training between two days and two months after completing MEPS testing requirements. The second, and more common path to accession into military service is the "Delayed Entry Program" (DEP). Recruits who enter DEP commit to ship to basic training at an agreed upon date within one year, typically after completing high school.
National Trends in Casualties, Enlistments, and Guaranteed Training Contracts
The enlistments data is from the DMDC from October 1, 1997 to September 30, 2013. Figure 1 depicts the monthly U.S. casualties for all services and by service branch, where the red vertical line identifies the start of the war in Afghanistan and the grey area identifies the months spent in
Iraq. As can be seen, the majority of the casualties were from service members of the Army (72%), the Marine Corps (22%), and the Navy (3%). 18 Over the entire period the data allows us to identify white and non-white applicants but we are unable to split the non-white category into more detailed racial and ethnic groups. Not all new enlistees access into the military immediately after signing a contract. Many enlistees, particularly those recruited while in high school, enter the DEP and access into military service up to one year after signing their enlistment contract. The DMDC data does not contain direct information on applicants who entered the military through the DEP or who discharged from DEP. To construct the DEP sample, the enlistment sample is first limited to applicants who signed their enlistment contract at least two months prior to being accessed into military service (i.e., those who entered the military through DEP). This sample is then expanded to include applicants who signed an enlistment contract prior to October 31, 2012, but were not accessed into military service as of September 30, 2013 (i.e., those discharged from DEP).
The share of discharged applicants in the sample is about 18% (Table 1) with some variation in this share by service. Figure 2 depicts the national percent of discharged enlistees, by the enlistment contract month. Interestingly, the total proportion of enlistees discharged from DEP declines over time, but the trends reveal some heterogeneity by service. Although the overall trend of discharged enlistees is declining in the Army, there is some evidence of a deviation from this trend during years with high numbers of casualties. Other services show a slightly declining or flat trends in the proportion of discharged enlistees with no indication of deviations from the trend when the number of casualties was high.
Obtaining training in a specific skill is one of the military's main recruiting tools, highlighting the fact that military service is viewed as an investment in human capital by the military and many potential recruits. The Army and Navy, for instance, use guaranteed training as a major selling point in their recruiting efforts while emphasizing the opportunity for acquiring skills without any prior experience. 19 The DMDC data records whether a contract includes training guarantees when an enlistee accesses into military service. This information is not available for applicants who discharged from DEP. According to Table 1 , about 56% of Army enlistees and 83% of Navy enlistees are offered training guarantees during our sample period. The share of training guarantees in the remaining service branches is much smaller. Figure 3 , however, do not seem to consistently co-vary with the number of overall casualties or to the casualties within a service.
Local Casualties and Selection into the Military
Empirical Framework
An increase in the number of U.S. combat casualties could deter some young individuals from service, yet inspire others to join. Analyzing the impact of changes in national level casualties on selection into the military would be problematic because we cannot rule out the 12 possibility that other time-varying factors are deriving the relationship between the number of casualties and enlistments. Instead, we take advantage of county-and state-level exposure to casualties to analyze its impact on total enlistments, discharges, and quality of enlistees. Table 2 shows the probability of experiencing a U.S. combat casualty at the county-month level and the average number of casualties at the state-year levels for 2001-2012. Table 2 also lists the average number of enlistments at the county-month and state-year levels. On average, there was a 1.41 percent chance that a given county experienced a casualty in a month and an average of 9.25 casualties in a state in a given year.
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The identifying assumption is that controlling for county (or state) and time fixed effects, the assignment of casualties to counties (or states) in the U.S. is as-good-as random. Exposure to local casualties could have a separate effect on the decision to enlist from exposure to the nation- 
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To investigate this, we start by estimating the effect of experiencing a U.S. combat casualty from a county on the overall number of enlistments, and on the number of enlistments by demographic and ability characteristics from that county 21 :
where is the number of applicants (overall or with a specific characteristic) in county c who accessed into military service after signing their enlistment contract in sample month m. , , and are indicator variables equal to 1 if a county experienced a combat casualty in the six months before month m, in month m, and in the six months after month m, respectively and zero otherwise. We include the likelihood of a casualty in the six months after a contract is signed because recruits who enter DEP can change their decision to access into service between the contract and accession dates.
The vector includes controls for the unemployment rate at the county month level, and ln is the log of the annual county population. is number of accessions from the county seven to nine and ten to twelve months prior to the sample month.
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The regression also includes controls for county fixed effects ( ) sample month fixed effects ( ), and state specific linear month trends ( ). Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
Local combat casualties could cause potential recruits to change their minds about signing an enlistment contract or, for those who have already signed a contract but have not yet accessed into military service, to discharge from DEP. To estimate the latter effect more directly, we estimate the following equation using the DEP sample:
where is an indicator variable for whether applicant i in county c who signed a contract in month m was discharged from DEP. As before, ,
, and are indicator variables equal to 1 if a county experienced a combat casualty in the six months before month m, in month m, and in the six months after month m, respectively and zero otherwise. The vector includes controls for four AFQT categories, five age categories, race, and gender. We also include a full set of interaction terms between the three casualty indicator variables and the variables in in order to estimate whether the effects vary by observable characteristics. The vector includes additional controls for marital status and service (in the regressions that include all services). All other variables in Eq. (2) are defined as they are in Eq. (1). 
Results
We start by presenting the results from estimating Eq. (1) in Table 3 . The results suggest that exposure to at least one casualty in a given county-month decreases the number of new enlistments by about 1.2, significant at the 1 percent level. Exposure to casualties in the 6 months before or after a contract was signed also decreases the number of new enlistments but to a lesser degree. 24 Evaluated at the mean number of enlistments, these effects are large suggesting a decrease of about 16-28 percent. Exposure to casualties in the 6 months after a contract is signed impact enlistments because, as we will show later, they impact the number of applicants who initially sign a contract, but then decide to discharge from DEP. 25 Importantly, the effects decrease (in absolute value) monotonically with age (Panel A) and are largest for individuals in the middle part of the ability distribution (Panel C), consistent with the idea that the decision to not enlist at these ages could impact educational choices. In contrast, the recruitment of nonwhites seems to increase during periods of worse war conditions (Panel B).
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As we discussed earlier, exposure to casualties after signing a contract could change a recruit's decision to access into military service. Similarly, exposure to casualties in the 6 months before or in the same month the contract is signed could also motivate some individuals to enlist 24 Table Appendix A1 estimates the effects on overall enlistments by service. The results suggest that the Army and the Navy experience the largest decreases in new enlistments. We also experiment by using service-specific casualties in Table Appendix A2. The results are qualitatively similar for the Army but vary in magnitude and significance for the other services where the number of service specific casualties is more limited. Results for the Coast Guard are not presented because there are no Coast Guard-specific casualties. 25 The results also suggest that the decision to enlist is countercyclical with relation to the economic conditions at the county level, consistent with the findings of Borgschulte and Martorell (2015) and Christensen (2015) . 26 Because we conduct the education analysis at the state-year level, we also estimated equation 1 using variation in the number of casualties (in 100s) at the state-year level while including state and year fixed effects and statespecific linear trends. The results are reported in Table Appendix 3. They suggest that an increase of 100 casualties in a state decreases the number of yearly enlistments in that state by about 1,778 recruits, a decrease of about 5 percent. The results suggest that the results observed at the county-month level are not temporary and the smaller magnitude highlights the importance of proximity to a local casualty.
but who eventually decide not to access. In Table 4 , we present results on the effects of exposure to local casualties on the probability of discharging from service and how the effects vary by AFQT categories (Eq. 2). For the sake of brevity, we present the coefficients on the interaction terms with age, and race from this regression in Tables Appendix A4 and A5 . The results using the entire sample suggest that exposure to a casualty in the 6 months prior or after signing a contract increases the probability of discharging for 17-year-old white men in the highest AFQT category (the reference group) by about 7 percent (0.131/0.178 = 0.074). This effect monotonically decreases with AFQT scores. Similar patterns appear in the Army, Navy, and
Marines where most of the casualties occurred. 
Local Casualties and Investments in Human Capital
Empirical Framework
We now turn to analyze the effect of exposure to combat casualties at young ages on educational outcomes. For this analysis, we draw data from the 2002-2013 American Community Survey and limit the sample to men who turned 17 during the period 1999-2010. 28 In addition, we retain individuals aged 20 and above to ensure that we can observe their high school and college outcomes. As a result, the sample contains men aged 20-31. 29 The ACS data 17 identifies a person's state of birth, but not county of birth, and only identifies county of residence for large counties. As a result, the ACS analysis is conducted at the state level. 30 For each state of birth, we aggregate the yearly number of combat casualties and merge them into the ACS data based on the year an individual turned 17 years old. We also merge state-level unemployment rates when a person turned 17. Table 5 contains descriptive statistics for the analysis sample.
We estimate the following regression with OLS:
, 
Results
Before presenting the effects of local casualties on schooling outcomes, it is useful to examine whether exposure to casualties impact the probability of ever serving in the military.
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Thus, the first outcome we examine using Eq. (4) takes a value of 1 if an individual reported to have ever served in the military and zero otherwise. The results are presented in column 1 of Table 6 and suggest that an increase of 100 casualties at ages 17-18 is associated with a reduction of about 0.3 percentage points in the probability of ever serving in the military, significant at the 5 percent level. Evaluated at the mean service rate of 6 percent, the results suggest that exposure to casualties reduces the probability of ever serving in the military by about 5 percent. The magnitude of this effect is remarkably similar to the effect we report in Table Appendix A3 and is consistent with the findings reported in Tables 3 and 4 Because a high school diploma, or its equivalent, is required for enlisting for the vast majority of candidates, the decision not to enlist in the military could change the incentive of marginal candidates to graduate high school. Consequently, we can think about high school completion and military service as complementary choices such that a decrease in the probability of service is likely to be accompanied by a decrease in the probability of high school graduation or its equivalent (GED). We estimate the effects of exposure to casualties on the probability of dropping out from high school and report the results in column 2 of Table 6 . The results indicate that an increase of 100 casualties at age 17-18 is associated with an increase of about 0.3 percentage points in the probability of dropping out from high school. Evaluated at the mean, this corresponds to an increase of about 3 percent in the probability of not graduating from high school. The coefficient on ages 15-16 is small and statistically insignificant. Importantly, the coefficient on ages 19-20 is also small and statistically insignificant. This adds to our confidence in the research design since we should not expect casualties at ages 19-20 to influence an outcome that is typically determined at a younger age.
Next, we estimate the effect on college education and report the results in column 3 of Table 6 . The outcome is an indicator variable that takes 1 for attaining any post-secondary education and zero otherwise. The military, through the government issue (GI) Bill, can be an important vehicle through which disadvantaged groups can access post-secondary education.
Thus, conditional on high school graduation, exposure to casualties can limit access to college education by raising its cost.
The results suggest that an increase of 100 casualties at ages 17-18 decreases the probability of college education by about 0.69 percentage points or a decline of about 1 percent, significant at the 1 percent level. Exposure to casualties at ages 19-20 also reduces the probability of attaining college education but, as we would expect, the magnitude of the coefficient is reduced by about half. We find small, negative, but statistically insignificant effects of exposure at ages 15-16 on college education.
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In Table 7 we refine the educational outcomes and re-estimate the results. In columns 1 and 2 we limit the sample to survey years 2008-2013 in which we are able to identify a GED degree separately from a high school degree. Column 1 repeats the results reported in column 2
of Table 6 for this subsample of years. The results indicate that exposure to 100 more casualties 20 at ages 17-18 increases the probability of dropping out from high school by 0.4 percentage points (or about a 4 percent increase). In column 2 we consider individuals with a GED degree to be high school dropouts. The results suggest that an increase of 100 casualties at ages 17-18 increases the probability of dropping out from high school by 0.56 percentage points, which is an increase of about 3.4 percent. Taken together, these estimates suggest that the increase in probability of dropping out shown in column 2 of Table 6 is not being driven by a decrease in the probability of earning a GED. In columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 we explore the probability that exposure to casualties impacted the probability of obtaining at least an Associate degree or a BA degree. The results suggest that exposure to 100 more casualties at ages 17-18 decreases the probability of obtaining at least an Associate degree or a BA by about 0.7 and 0.6 percentage points, respectively (which is about a 3 percent decrease).
It is difficult to use the above estimates to gauge the overall magnitude of the military option in shaping human capital investments. However, local combat casualties seem to have a significant effect on the desirability of military service and are associated with detectable and significant impacts on educational outcomes. The results using local casualties should be interpreted as lower bound effects, since the overall (national) risk of military service during wartime on enlistment decisions and educational outcomes is likely to be significantly larger. Table 8 reports the effects of exposure to casualties by race and ethnic groups. The results in columns 1-3 suggest that the effect of casualties on high school completion at ages 17-18 is driven primarily by Hispanic men. The coefficient suggests that an increase of 100 casualties at ages 17-18 increases the probability of dropping out from high school by 0.65 percentage points. Table 7 , this corresponds to a 3 percent increase in the probability of dropping out from high school.
Heterogeneous Effects
Consistent with the results in
In columns 4-6, we report the results for college education. The results indicate that exposure to 100 more combat casualties at ages 17-18 reduces to the probability of college education for white men by about 0.74 percentage points, significant at the 5 percent level. The results in this age range are small and statistically insignificant for Hispanic and black men.
Exposure to 100 more casualties at ages 19-20, however, reduces the probability of college education for Hispanic men by about 0.81 percentage points, which is a decline of about 1.8 percent in the probability of having any college education.
Next, we analyze the outcomes by state population size in Table 9 . We split the sample into 3 groups, each containing about one third of the overall U.S. population resulting in comparable sample sizes. 34 The results suggest that the effect of casualties on high school completion at ages 17-18 is largest in the most populous states (column 1), perhaps because they are also the states with the highest proportion of Hispanic men. In contrast, an increase of 100 casualties at ages 17-18 reduces the probability of college education by about 0.8-1 percentage point in large and medium size states and by about 3.6 percentage points in small states. These results suggest that conditional on high school graduation, removing the military option has a sizable effect on college access for young men.
Finally, we replace the number of combat casualties that a state experienced in equation (4) with the number of soldiers who were wounded in action (WIA), measured in thousands.
The results of this exercise are reported in Table 10 . As can be seen, the results using this 34 The large states sample includes: California, Florida, New York, and Texas. The medium states sample includes: Arizona, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington. The remaining states are included in the small states sample.
alternative measure are consistent with the results reported in Table 6 . Specifically, an increase of 1,000 WIA soldiers at ages 17-18 decreases the probability of ever serving in the military by about 0.52 percentage points, increases the probability of dropping out from high school by 0.35 percentage points, and decreases the probability of college education by about 1 percentage point.
Conclusion
American youth face a variety of factors constraining them from obtaining postsecondary education and training. Understanding the impact of changes in these factors on accessing education and human capital investments is important in light of recent evidence
showing that the returns to education are large even for academically marginal students (Zimmerman 2014), and can also shed light on recent policy debates concerning college affordability.
Enlisting in the U.S. military allows many individuals to overcome such barriers and invest in their human capital. In this paper, we show that increasing the (perceived) cost of military service has detrimental effects on the schooling outcomes of individuals at the margin of high school graduation and individuals at the margin of college education.
Using internal military data, we first show that exposure to combat casualties during the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars from a U.S. home county (and state) decreases the supply of new soldiers in that county and changes the characteristics of those who choose to enlist. In particular, an increase in the number of casualties discourages youth with medium to high AFQT scores, whites, 17-20 year olds, and both genders from enlisting. Our identification strategy relies on the assumption that the assignment of casualties to U.S. home of record counties is as-23 good-as random and that it does not impact the demand for soldiers at the local level, which is instead set nationally.
The main results in the paper suggest that exposure to combat casualties at a young age (17-18) increases the probability of dropping out from high school, and decreases the probability of attaining any college education, obtaining an Associate, or a BA degree. This indicates that, at least for some youth, the military option is advantageous to them, motivates them to finish high school, and serves as an important vehicle through which they access post-secondary education and acquire marketable skills.
The results also suggest that improving access to post-secondary education for lowskilled and academically marginal students can have significant impacts on their human capital investments. This is a particularly relevant population that should inform local and national educational finance policies that are intended to increase the supply of higher skilled labor force. Notes: Standard errors clustered at the county level are shown in parentheses. The sample includes new enlistments with no prior military service, with a U.S. home state, and who accessed into military service after they signed their enlistment contract. Data is aggregated to the county-month level. Casualties are indicator variables equal to one if there was a U.S. combat casualty from the county in the months before, during, and after the enlistment contracts were signed. All regressions include controls for the unemployment rate at the county-month level, log of annual county population, number of accessions from the county seven to nine and ten to twelve months prior to the sample month, as well as county fixed effects, sample-month fixed effects, and state specific linear sample-month trends. Table 4 and Appendix Table A4 report additional coefficients from these regressions. Source: Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) from October 1, 1998 to October 31, 2012. Notes: Standard errors clustered county level are shown in parentheses. The sample includes applicants who signed an enlistment contract with no prior military service and with a U.S. home state. An applicant is considered to have been in the delayed entry program (DEP) if the enlistment contract was signed at least two months prior to the date the applicant accessed into military service. An applicant is considered to have discharged from DEP if the application was not accessed into military service as of October 31, 2013. Casualties are indicator variables equal to one if there was a U.S. combat casualty from the county in the months before, during, and after the enlistment contracts were signed. All regressions include controls for the unemployment rate at the county month level, log of annual county population, number of accessions from the county seven to nine and ten to twelve months prior to the sample month, five age categories, five AFQT categories, six education categories, marital status, gender, as well as county fixed effects, sample-month fixed effects, and state specific linear sample-month trends. Table 6 . Columns 1 and 2 limit the sample to data for the period 2008-2013 in which a GED degree can be separately identified. The sample in column 1 defines individuals with a GED degree as high school graduates while the sample in column 2 defines individuals with a GED degree as high school dropouts. Notes: Standard errors clustered at the county level are shown in parentheses. The sample includes new enlistments with no prior military service, with a U.S. home state, and who accessed into military service after they signed their enlistment contract. Data is aggregated to the county-month level. Casualties are indicator variables equal to one if there was a U.S. combat casualty from the county in the months before, during, and after the enlistment contracts were signed. All regressions include controls for the unemployment rate at the county month level, log of annual county population, number of accessions from the county seven to nine and ten to twelve months prior to the sample month, as well as county fixed effects, sample-month fixed effects, and state specific linear sample-month trends. 
